The effect of culture on the fertility decisions of immigrant women in the United States by Marcén, Miriam et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effect of culture on the fertility
decisions of immigrant women in the
United States
Miriam Marce´n and Jose Alberto Molina and Marina Morales
Universidad de Zaragoza
9 December 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75511/
MPRA Paper No. 75511, posted 10 December 2016 09:47 UTC
1 
 
The effect of culture on the fertility decisions of immigrant women in the 
United States 
Miriam Marcén
1
, José Alberto Molina
1,2
 and Marina Morales
1 
1
Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain 
2
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether culture plays a role in the number of children born. To 
explore this issue, we use data on immigrant women who arrived in the United States 
under 6 years old. Since all these women are resident in the same country from their early 
lives, and grew up under the same laws, institutions, and economic conditions, then the 
differences between them by country of origin may be due to cultural differences, as the 
epidemiological approach suggests. Following that approach, we identify the cultural 
effect, exploiting variations in the mean number of children born by country of origin, 
using data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International that allows us to 
measure more precisely the cultural proxy by age, education level, and employment status. 
Results show that the home-country mean number of children born has a positive and 
statistically significant relationship to the number of children born of immigrants living in 
the US, suggesting that culture is important. Our findings are robust to the introduction of 
several home country variables, and to the use of different subsamples. Our results are 
maintained when we control for unobservable characteristics by country of origin. 
Additionally, we extend this work to an analysis of both the decision to have children and 
the number of children born, finding again that culture appears to play a significant role. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
How many children would you like to have? According to the World Values Survey, the 
response should be between none and three, since around 80% of the individuals who 
answered that survey during the period 1981-2004 chose that as their ideal number of 
children.
1
 But how has the fertility rate evolved from the last decades of the 20
th
 century? 
As shown in Figure 1, the total fertility rate, calculated for all the countries with 
information on that rate, from 1980 to 2014, has fallen significantly (World Bank Data 
2014) and
 
does not appear to bottoming out.
2
 In many countries, the total fertility rate has 
dropped to worrying levels, below the replacement rate, set at 2.1 children per woman. 
Even the media highlight the necessity to analyze these low levels of fertility (The 
Economist 2014). Several studies have explored the factors that may explain the 
progressive decline in the fertility rate, focusing on the increase in the participation of 
women in the labor market (Ahn and Mira 2002; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Engelhardt 
et al. 2004; Michael 1985), the increased opportunity cost of women's time (Becker 1981), 
technological progress (Galor and Weil 1996; Greenwood and Seshadri 2002), the decline 
in infant mortality rates (Doepke 2005; Sah 1991), the reform of the laws that have made 
birth control and abortion more accessible (Ananat et al. 2007; Goldin and Katz 2000, 
2002; Guldi 2008), and the introduction of reforms in divorce laws (Bellido and Marcén 
2014), among others. 
 Although all of these, separately and together, can influence the evolution of the 
fertility rates in the majority of countries, a global pattern of convergence of fertility 
behavior is not clearly observed (see Figure 2). Those countries with low fertility rates in 
1980 maintain those low rates low in 2014. The same occurs in most of the countries with 
high fertility rates during the 1980s; their fertility rates remain high in 2014.
3
 This leads us 
to ask whether there are social norms or cultural attitudes that affect the number of 
children that women decide to have, or are such economic and institutional differences the 
only things that matter. In this paper, we examine the possible effect of culture on the 
number of children being born. 
                                                            
1 In the subsequent waves of the World Values Survey, that question or a similar one has not been included. 
2 The total fertility rate is defined as the mean number of children that would be born alive to a woman 
during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates by age 
of a given year. 
3 For those countries having high fertility rates in 1980, there is more variations in the fertility rates observed 
in 2014, although, as we mention above, most of them have maintained high fertility rates in 2014. 
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 Following the definition proposed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO 2001), we define culture as the set of distinctive 
spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features of society or a social group. Not 
only does this encompass art and literature, but it also includes lifestyles, ways of living 
together, value systems, traditions, and beliefs. Nearly all researchers would agree that 
culture is an important determinant of human behavior (Giuliano 2016), but it is not easy 
to measure. The interrelation among institutions, economic conditions, and social norms is 
one source of that difficulty (Fernández 2007; Sevilla 2010). In order to isolate the impact 
of culture from the effect of institutions and economic conditions, we follow the 
epidemiological approach (Fernández 2007), by exploring the behavior of immigrant 
women who arrived in the US before age 6, and whose ethnicity or country of origin is 
known. To document the importance of the impact of culture on the number of children 
that women decide to have, we use dissimilarities in the number of children born by 
country of origin, since women’s attitudes are probably similar to the preferences of their 
parents, forebears, and ethnic communities. 
There is a growing literature analyzing the impact of culture on socio-economic and 
demographic variables (Fernández 2011; Giuliano 2016). Utilizing empirical strategies 
analogous to ours, researchers have shown the substantial effect of culture on women’s 
labor force participation and fertility (Contreras and Plaza 2010; Fernández and Fogli 
2006; Fernández 2007; Fernández and Fogli 2009), unemployment (Brügger et al. 2009), 
self-employment (Marcén 2014), the search for a job (Eugster et al. 2016), on living 
arrangements (Giuliano 2007), divorce (Furtado et al. 2013), on the math gender gap 
(Nollenberger et al. 2016), and even on the fertility behavior of teen women (Bellido et al. 
2016). We contribute to these lines of research by extending the analysis on the impact of 
culture on the number children born. 
 In our empirical analysis, we use data from the 5% Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS) of the 1990 US census (Ruggles et al. 2015), which is the last census 
containing information on the number of children born per woman. To capture the effect 
of culture, we utilize data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International 
(International IPUMS), Minnesota Population Center (2015). The International IPUMS 
provides rich information that, in contrast to prior research on the effect of culture on 
fertility decisions, allows us to measure the cultural variable more precisely by age, 
education level, and employment status. This is an important issue, since other studies 
focusing on the relationship between culture and fertility are based on the assumption that 
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fertility culture does not differ within each country of origin depending on women’s 
characteristics, which can be a strong supposition. Our findings suggest that culture is an 
important factor in determining the behavior of women, even after including socio-
economic characteristics. We find that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the number of children born to immigrant women in the US, and the 
mean number of children of their counterparts in their respective countries of origin, 
though the effect of culture appears to be small when the cultural proxy does not take into 
account that attitudes towards fertility may vary by age, education level, and employment 
status. Our results are unaffected after controlling for unobservable characteristics of the 
countries of origin, including country of origin fixed effects, and using different 
subsamples. This provides additional evidence that our estimates are identifying the effect 
of culture, rather than the impact of unobserved individual characteristics that can be 
correlated within ethnic groups. The effect of culture is also detected in the analysis of 
both the decision to have a child and the number of children that women decide to have, 
using double hurdle models.  
 In the last section, we study the horizontal transmission of culture, following 
Furtado et al. (2013). Culture is not only transmitted from parents to their children, but 
also within the communities in which women live (Fernández and Fogli, 2009). 
Unfortunately, we cannot directly analyze how the intergenerational transmission of 
culture operates with the information provided by the Census. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to explore the horizontal transmission, following a network approach. We can interpret a 
positive relationship between an increase in the concentration of individuals of the same 
ethnicity and the number of children born to immigrant women, as evidence of the 
existence of a horizontal transmission of culture. If the effect of this horizontal 
transmission is not quite significant, it could be suggested that the intergenerational 
transmission of culture does play a more important role. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical 
strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Our results are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 
concludes. 
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2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Following the epidemiological approach, our empirical strategy is based on the fact that 
immigrant women who arrived in the US when very young have all lived under the same 
US markets and institutions. Thus, if only institutions and markets are important in the 
fertility decisions of women, we would expect no effect of the home-country mean 
number of children of their counterparts on the number of children that those immigrant 
women have in the US. On the other hand, if culture does play a role in the decision of 
immigrant women, we would expect to observe that the home-country mean number of 
children does have an effect on the number of children that immigrant women have in 
their host country, in our case, the US. Formally, we analyze this issue by estimating the 
following equation: 
 
                                                              
where      is the number of children born to woman i, whose country of origin is j and 
lives in the state k. Our measure of culture,       , is the mean number of children born 
in the home country j. We revisit the definition of the cultural variable and its implications 
below. In any case, if culture really matters, women from countries whose counterparts 
have many children should maintain a similar behavior, having many children in their host 
country, whereas those women, whose counterparts in their home country have fewer 
children, should also have fewer children. Then, we would expect β1 to be positive. Xijk 
includes women’s individual characteristics, which may have an impact on the number of 
children for reasons other than culture, such as age or education (Leon 2004). In addition, 
we control for the unobservable differences across US states by introducing state fixed 
effects, denoted by   .
4
 Standard errors are clustered at the home country level in order to 
account for any within-ethnicity correlation in the error terms. 
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With this empirical strategy, we can only examine the impact of culture on the 
number of children born. We note that our work is not limited to the analysis of that 
relationship only, since we also focus on the decision to have children. To address this 
issue, we utilize double hurdle models that permit us to study the effect of culture on the 
decision whether or not to have children, and, for those who do decide to have children, 
                                                            
4 We have re-run the entire analysis using Metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects. We do not find 
substantial differences in our results.  
5 All estimates have been repeated with/without weights and with/without clusters. Results do not vary. 
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we can analyze the role of culture on the number of children born. This methodology is 
discussed in detail in Section 4. 
 
3. DATA 
We use data from the 5% IPUMS of the 1990 US census, which is the last census 
containing information on the number of children born. Our sample selection consists of 
immigrant women living in the US, aged 16 to 46 years old, who arrived in that country 
when they were aged 5 or younger, and who report their country of origin.
6
 As we explain 
above, since the preferences and attitudes of these immigrant women are likely to be 
similar to those of their parents and ethnic communities, it is possible to interpret any 
dissimilarity in the mean number of children born by country of origin as supporting 
evidence of the importance of culture. Our main sample contains 5,726 observations of 
immigrant women, originating from 26 countries.
7
  
We have chosen first-generation immigrants, although most of the prior literature 
analyzing the effect of culture on several variables mainly uses information on second-
generation immigrants who are unlikely to suffer language barriers or the immigration 
shock (Fernández 2007; Fernández and Fogli 2006, 2009; Furtado et al. 2013; Giuliano 
2007). Unfortunately, second-generation immigrants cannot be incorporated in our 
sample, because the last year for which the census provides information about the country 
of origin of parents is 1970. We prefer to use more recent data because it can be argued 
that recent changes in, for example, the participation of women in the labor force, may 
have influenced on the transmission of culture, making social norms less important than 
markets and institutions in the fertility decisions of women during the last decades of the 
20
th
 century. As Furtado et al. (2013) maintain, our sample of young immigrant women 
arrivals can be considered quite similar to a sample of second-generation immigrants 
because of their early migration process. The laws and institutions of their home country 
are unlikely to have influence on an individual younger than 6, and the language barriers 
                                                            
6 We have eliminated those countries of origin with less than 10 observations per country, as in prior studies. 
It is also worth noting that the analysis has been repeated by selecting a sample of immigrant women who 
arrived in the US under age 11 and results are similar. We can only select women younger than 47 years old 
because the IPUMS USA only contains information on the number of children born to women younger than 
47. Note that the sample is limited to those living in MSAs. 
7 We incorporate women who decide to have children. We revisit this issue below by repeating the analysis 
including those who do not have children. 
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and the shock of the immigration are not likely to be lasting for them (Furtado et al. 2013), 
as young migrants are capable of quickly adapting to a new place of residence.  
The cultural proxy is defined as the home-country mean number of children born. 
Data come from the microdata of the censuses (IPUMS International); see Appendix. As 
mentioned above, our measure of culture differs from that utilized in prior literature where 
the total fertility rate is the cultural proxy. In that setting, it is implicitly assumed that all 
women originating from a specific country have the same fertility culture, regardless of 
their age, level of education, or employment status. So, for example, this would imply that 
having no children is equally acceptable for young women as for those at the end of their 
fertility years, or having few children is equally acceptable to society for those women 
with a high level of education, or who are employed, as for those with a low level of 
education, or those who are inactive in the labor market. This can be a strong assumption, 
since, even in a country in which the social norm is that women should have many 
children, it is possible to argue that the fertility culture differs depending on women’s 
characteristics, as Bellido et al. (2016) show for the case of teen motherhood. For this 
reason, we prefer to build our cultural proxy using data from the country of origin 
censuses, which allows us to consider possible fertility-cultural differences by age, 
education level, and employment status. Therefore, if culture varies depending on the 
specific characteristics of women, we should observe dissimilarities in our estimates, 
depending on the way in which that variable is measured. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the relevant variables, ordered from the 
lowest to the highest home-country mean number of children born. As can be seen, there 
are considerable differences among countries of origin: from 2.14 children per woman in 
Hungary, to 4.84 children per woman in Morocco, which may point to the existence of 
cultural differences in the fertility behavior.
8
 The rest of the columns describe the main 
sample. Immigrant women have 2.03 children in the US on average, with those originating 
from China and Hungary having the highest number of children. Surprisingly, comparing 
these two columns, we cannot deduce a clear relationship between the variable that 
measures the effect of culture and the number of children born to immigrant women in the 
US. Divergences in fertility behavior appear to be notable for those immigrant women 
having more than two children. However, for those immigrant women having fewer than 
two children, the relationship appears to be clearly positive: the greater the number of 
                                                            
8 To calculate the mean number of children ever born by country of origin, we have excluded those women 
having no children. 
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children in the home country, the more children immigrant women originating from that 
home country have in the US (see Figure 3). Although the differences detected in those 
summary statistics can be due to dissimilarities in the transmission of culture, or in the 
effect of culture, it should be noted that the composition of the immigrant women sample 
by country of origin can be significant. By simply looking at the age of immigrant women, 
we can observe that those having more than two children on average by country of origin 
tend to be older individuals, although not in all cases. Overall, the age of the women in our 
sample is around 30 years old, on average, with the youngest women originating from El 
Salvador and Thailand, around 20 years old on average, and with the oldest being from 
Austria and China, more than 35 years old on average. This age gap in the structure of 
immigrant women by country of origin can be a little problematic in order to analyze the 
effect of culture on the number of children born, since some of the women are at the 
beginning of their reproductive life, while others are near the end of that stage. Thus, the 
introduction of controls for the age of women is necessary to address this issue.  
 However, there is an additional problem that the age gap can generate. It can be 
surmised that attitudes towards fertility behavior could vary, not only across countries but 
also across age groups within countries. In one country, it may be socially acceptable to 
have children when women are young, while in others it may be less acceptable. To 
explore the potential cultural differences by age, we have redefined the culture variable as 
the mean number of children born, by country of origin and age group, with the age 
groups being: 20 to 29, 30 to 39, and 40 to 46.
9
 Within this framework, rather than 
calculating only one measure of the cultural proxy for each home country, we are able to 
incorporate three measures of the fertility culture for each country of origin. Figures 4 to 6 
show the relationship between the mean number of children that immigrant women decide 
to have in the US, and the mean number of children born to their counterparts by country 
of origin and age group. Surprisingly, the relationship appears to be negative for women 
aged 20 to 29, but this is generated by the presence of immigrant women from China; 
without that country, the relationship is clearly positive (see Figure 4).
10
 Figures 5 and 6 
show a similar relationship for immigrant women aged 30 to 39 and for those aged 40 to 
46, respectively. In both cases, we observe the expected positive relationship between the 
                                                            
9 We do not include in that analysis those immigrant women under age 20 because the number of 
observations is very small for that age group. For consistency, all our estimates have been repeated without 
those women and our results are similar. The effect of fertility culture on teen motherhood is examined in 
Bellido et al. (2016). 
10 We revisit the Chinese case below. 
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two variables: the higher the home-country mean number of children born, the greater the 
number of children that immigrant women decide to have in the US. What also appears to 
show in these figures (4 to 6) is that there are possible differences within each country in 
attitudes to fertility behavior. While, for example, in Argentina and Colombia, women 
tend to have a similar number of children when they are young, we observe considerable 
dissimilarities between those two countries for women aged 40 to 46: those in Argentina 
have around 3 children on average, while those in Colombia have more than 4 children. 
The differences in the level of education of immigrant women by home country 
may also provoke concerns on how and to whom the fertility culture may play a role. 
Averaged across countries of origin, 33% have completed High School, ranging from a 
low of 13% for Iran and Venezuela, to a high of 40-42% for Ecuador and Spain. With 
respect to those who have completed at least a college degree (some college, that is, 1 to 3 
years of degree studies, and more college, that is, 4 and more than 4 years of degree 
studies), the lowest percentages are observed among those originating from Mexico, 
Thailand, and El Salvador (less than 35%), and the highest among those from Iran, Peru, 
and Haiti (more than 70%). Since, normally, less educated women tend to have more 
children than more educated (Barro and Becker 1988; Willis 1973) the incorporation in 
our work of controls on education is necessary. Nevertheless, we should remember that, in 
this setting, the attitudes to fertility may also vary depending on the level of education of 
women within each country. For example, in one country it may be more socially 
acceptable for a woman to have few children if her education level is high, but this may be 
less acceptable for a woman with a low education level. As before, to tackle this issue, we 
redefine the cultural proxy as the mean number of children born by country of origin, age, 
and education level. As we do for the education level, we repeat the same analysis with the 
mean number of children calculated by country of origin, age, and employment status 
(employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force).  
 
4. RESULTS 
a. Baseline Model 
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for our main specification, including age and 
education controls, eq. (1), and with the cultural proxy defined as the home-country mean 
number of children born. As can be observed in Column 1, a higher mean number of 
children born in an immigrant’s home country is related to an increase in the number of 
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children that the immigrant women decide to have. The cultural effect, although it is 
statistically significant, appears to be quite small, since if the home-country mean number 
of children born increases by one, there is an increase of almost 0.08 children born to the 
immigrant women. Comparing countries of origin, immigrant women from countries 
where their counterparts have few children (for example, Hungary, Germany, or Austria), 
would have 0.21 fewer children because of the impact of culture, than those immigrants 
whose counterparts have a large number of children in their home countries (Morocco, 
Nicaragua, or Mexico). While the effect of culture would be around 0.16 children per 
woman in the first case, it would be approximately 0.37 in the second case. 
As expected, the older the immigrant women, the more likely are those women to 
have a greater number of children. The impact of age appears to have an inverted U-shape, 
achieving the maximum at 47 years old. Note that our immigrant women are all aged 
below the age of 47. The estimates for the education level controls are consistent with the 
literature, since the higher the level of education, the lower the number of children that 
women decide to have. As is explained in the existing literature, this occurs because of the 
increase in the opportunity costs of time for those more educated individuals (Barro and 
Becker 1988; Willis 1973), and/or because of the negative effect that having a high level 
of education can have on the age at first marriage of women (Breierova and Duflo 2004), 
which, in turn, delays childbearing and reduces the possibilities of having a large number 
of children (Kalwij 2000). In the second column, state fixed effects are added to control 
for unobservable characteristics that may vary at the state level. Column 3 includes 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) fixed effects, rather than state fixed effects, to 
capture the unobservable characteristics.
11
 In both cases, we still find a positive 
association between the home-country mean number of children born and the number of 
children that the immigrant women give birth to, but the effect of culture is even smaller 
than that obtained before, and it is only statistically significant at the 10% level. 
The minor role of culture in fertility may indicate that those estimates are not well-
capturing the impact of culture on fertility. This may be due to the fact that the age 
structure of the sample of immigrant women is different from that of their counterparts in 
their respective countries of origin. To tackle this issue, we repeat the analysis considering 
a sample of women aged 40 to 46 years old, in which we mitigate the concerns that a 
                                                            
11 IPUMS USA defines a metropolitan area as a region formed by neighboring communities that have a high 
degree of economic and social integration with the urban core. The population threshold to identify an MSA 
is 100,000 inhabitants. 
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different age structure of the immigrant sample could generate. Those women aged 40 to 
46 constitute an interesting sample in our analysis, since they are all at the end of their 
reproductive lives, so variations in the number of children born would be expected to be 
quite insignificant. In this situation, we can explore the effect of culture at the end of the 
reproductive period of women. Results are shown in Table 3, in columns 1 (with the 
home-country mean number of children born measured as in Table 2) and 2 (with the 
home-country mean number of children born calculated for women aged 40 to 46). We 
find that the impact of the cultural proxy, regardless of the measure utilized, remains 
statistically significant and positive, with the magnitude of the cultural effect being more 
than 60% greater, pointing to a more important role of culture in fertility decisions than 
that described above.  
Another way to examine the potential age structure problem is by utilizing several 
measures of culture, one for each age group (20-29, 30-39, and 40-46) and country of 
origin. This analysis is necessary since, as explained above, even in countries with similar 
general fertility behavior such as having few children per woman, it is possible to argue 
that the effect of culture varies depending on the age of women, with some countries 
having, for example, more acceptable attitudes towards women having children when 
young, while, in certain countries, young women having children may be ostracized. 
Columns 4 and 5 report the estimates with this new measure of culture. To run this 
analysis, we have excluded those individuals younger than age 20, because of the 
availability of observations. To easily compare the results, column 3 reports the estimates 
using the previous definition of culture, but for the same sample as used in columns 4 and 
5. We also note that the use of the new definition of culture, that includes three possible 
measures of fertility culture by country of origin, permits us to add country of origin fixed 
effects. This is very important because one of the main problems found in prior papers on 
the impact of culture is that they do not incorporate those fixed effects by country of 
origin, without which there can be some concerns about exactly what is being picked up 
by the estimated coefficient on the cultural proxy. That coefficient could be capturing the 
effect of culture on fertility in addition to, or instead of, the impact of other unobservable 
characteristics that vary at the home country level, and that also affect fertility decisions. It 
is comforting that, even after adding those home-country fixed effects, our findings are 
unaffected, the cultural proxy has a positive impact on the number of children born, and 
the magnitude of the effect has considerably improved, by almost 80% with respect to that 
presented in column 3 of Table 3. Then, these estimates provide additional evidence 
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suggesting that we are, in fact, capturing the impact of culture on the number of children 
that women decide to have. 
Apart from differences in the age structure, dissimilarities in the education and 
employment status may be important in determining the effect of culture on fertility. 
Within the same country of origin, for women with high levels of education, it may be 
socially more acceptable to have fewer children than those who are less well-educated. 
These differences can be transmitted to immigrant women, for example, by way of a 
horizontal transmission of culture, since immigrant women can see how their ethnic 
communities behave with women having different levels of education. We tackle this 
issue by redefining, again, our cultural proxy, taking into consideration the possible 
fertility-cultural differences by education level within the same country. The results are 
shown in the first column of Table 4, which corresponds to the specification of a model in 
which the culture variable is calculated as the mean number of children born in the 
country of origin by age and education level. Twelve different measures of fertility culture 
for each country of origin are reckoned, depending on whether women are aged 20 to 29, 
30 to 39 or 40 to 46, and on whether women have not completed High School, have 
completed High School, have studied 1 to 3 years of college degree studies, or 4 or more 
years of college degree studies. The estimated coefficient on the cultural proxy is positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that culture plays an important role in the decision 
of the number of children that women decide to have. Since the sample varies because of 
the availability of information on the education variable in some countries of origin, we 
re-run the analysis considering the same sample as in column 1 but using the cultural 
proxy of Table 2. The estimates are displayed in column 3, showing that the magnitude of 
the effect is greater after redefining the cultural proxy by age, education level, and country 
of origin. The effect of culture on the number of children born is maintained even after 
adding the fixed effects at the country of origin level (see column 2). 
In the following specifications in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4, our variable of 
interest is defined as the home-country mean number of children born, by age and 
employment status, so we have nine different measures of fertility culture by country 
depending on the age group (20-29, 30-39, 40-46) and the employment status (employed, 
unemployed or inactive). As above, we run those specifications to take into account 
possible dissimilarities in the fertility culture by age and employment status within each 
country of origin. We find that, with or without the country of origin fixed effects, there is 
a positive and statistically significant association between the cultural proxy and the 
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number of children born to immigrant women. Again, the magnitude of the effect of 
culture on the number of children born is considerably higher than that obtained when the 
cultural proxy does not take into account the possible cultural differences within countries 
(see column 6). The same is observed when the sample is limited to those aged 40 to 46 
years old, in columns 7 and 8.  
 In terms of robustness, we consider whether our findings are maintained when 
measuring the cultural proxy in different years, utilizing different subsamples, and 
incorporating additional observable characteristics at the country of origin level. Results 
are reported in Tables 5 and 6. In all previous specifications, we have obtained the cultural 
proxy using information on the country of origin for the year 1990, or the closest 
available, based on the notion that immigrant women living in the US in 1990 behave 
similarly to their counterparts in their country of origin in that year.
12
 Nonetheless, since 
culture is transmitted from parents to their offspring when they are young, it can be argued 
that the behavior of immigrant women is quite similar to that of their parents when they 
had their children, so the cultural proxy should be measured some decades before. Since 
our women are 30 years old on average in 1990, we use information on the 1970s as a 
proxy of the culture that their parents transmitted. As Fernández (2007) explains, culture 
changes very slowly, so we should observe similar results by measuring the cultural proxy 
in different years. That is what we find; results do not change (see the first column of 
Table 5).
13
 As simple robustness checks, we repeat the analysis without the two countries 
with the highest and the lowest home-country mean number of children born (Hungary 
and Morocco) to check whether this is driving our estimates. Results can be observed in 
columns 2 to 5 of Table 5, with all the definitions of the cultural proxy. Our findings do 
not vary. Furthermore, in column 6, we have removed those women originating from 
China, since that country has legislation that imposes limits on the number of children 
born per woman, which can affect the measure of the fertility culture of that country for 
reasons independent of social norms. Results remain the same after this exclusion. We 
have also eliminated those immigrant women from Mexico and Germany, that is, the 
countries with the largest number of observations, and without Chinese women, in the last 
column of Table 5.
14
.We can conclude the same when we add additional controls for 
                                                            
12 We also run the entire analysis without those immigrants with no information of their country of origin 
close to the year 1990 (for example, Iran 2006, see Appendix). Results are unaffected. 
13 The variation in the sample size is due to the availability of information for the 1970s. 
14 We want to note that all the estimates in which the cultural proxy is defined by age and employment status 
exclude women originating from Germany, because the German Census does not contain information on that 
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observable characteristics of the countries of origin in Table 6. We introduce GDP per 
capita (in constant 2005 US $), female labor force participation, the total fertility rate, and 
the unemployment rate. It is worth noting that the inclusion of the total fertility rate, which 
is a measure of the fertility behavior in other studies, does not alter our estimates. As can 
be seen in Table 6, regardless of the measure of the cultural proxy, the estimated 
coefficients do not change substantially. In short, all the results described in this section 
suggest that culture affects the number of children born. 
 
b. Having children or not and, if so, how many? 
Up to here, the analysis has been carried out considering a sample of women who have 
children. Thus, our conclusions would only be applicable to women who decide to have 
children. However, the use of a truncated sample can be problematic, since the sample of 
excluded women, those who have no children, has not been selected randomly. In this 
setting, it may be suggested that the estimated effect of culture on the number of children 
born is confounding both the impact of the decision to have children, and that of the 
number of children born. 
To explore both decisions, we propose other methodologies. We first consider a 
Tobit model (Tobin 1958) that allows us to take into account the decision to have children, 
and the number of children that women decide to have. Formally: 
  
    
                                                        
         
             
     
                        
    
where     
  is the unobservable latent variable. The rest of the variables are defined as 
before. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 show the regression results after defining the cultural 
proxy by age group, with/without state fixed effects, respectively.
15
 In both columns, the 
effect of the home-country mean number of children born is positive and statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
variable (as the rest of the international censuses do). Without those individuals, results are maintained, as 
can be seen in our robustness checks. 
15 The home-country number of children born measured by age group is used here as a cultural proxy since, 
as we have explained in the previous section, our results improve when the cultural differences by age are 
considered. Results do not change substantially when we calculate the cultural proxy by age and education 
level, and by age and employment status. 
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significant. This finding again indicates that immigrant women originating from countries 
with a high mean number of children born tend to have many children, whereas those 
originating from countries with a low mean number of children born tend to have few 
children, because of the fertility cultural differences. 
One key limitation of the Tobit model is that the explanatory variables have the 
same effect on the probability of having children, or not,       
    , and on the number 
of children,            
     , which appears to be unrealistic. To tackle this issue, we 
explore the use of alternative, double hurdle models. As in the Tobit model, both 
decisions, having children or not, and how many children to have, are taken into 
consideration in the double hurdle models. First, we analyze the decision of women to 
have children, or not, and, then, among those who do decide to have children, we examine 
the decision of how many children to have. The first stage is defined as follows: 
 
    
                                                       
           
                                      
           
                                        
where     
  is an unobservable latent variable. The second stage is defined as follows: 
 
    
                                     
         
             
               
           
              
This double hurdle model corresponds to a generalization of the Tobit model 
proposed by Cragg (Cragg 1971). Results are presented in columns 3 (first stage, having 
children, or not) and 4 (second stage, how many children). The cultural proxy is also 
defined by age group. Our results suggest that women originating from countries where 
the mean number of children is high are more likely to decide to have children than those 
whose counterparts in their country of origin decide to have few children. The higher the 
home-country mean number of children, the higher the probability of having children, and 
the higher the cultural proxy, the higher the number of children that women have. Then, 
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the impact of culture on the decision to have children is not driving our findings, since 
there is an effect of culture on the decision to have children, but there is also an effect on 
the decision of how many children to have. To provide more evidence that we are fully 
capturing the cultural effect on the number of children born, we also follow the proposal 
of Gurmu (1997), by estimating another double hurdle model. In the first stage of this 
model, the decision to have children is estimated via a logit model. In the second stage, we 
estimate the number of children using a truncated at zero negative binomial regression. 
Columns 5 and 6 show the estimated results. Our interpretation of the results coincides 
with the previous one, although the coefficients differ in magnitude, which is not 
surprising since the models are different. All these results reinforce our conclusions, 
suggesting that culture is an important factor in the fertility decision of women.
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c. How can culture be transmitted? 
The results described earlier suggest that culture affects the number of children that 
women decide to have, but with that analysis we cannot determine whether culture has 
been transmitted horizontally, through neighbors, friends or the ethnic communities in 
which immigrant women live, or vertically, through parents (grandparents or other 
ancestors) who probably instill values in their children. This is of concern since it can be 
surmised that the home-country mean number of children born has no effect on the 
decisions of immigrant women, but that immigrants simply behave as their parents do. 
Thus, it can be suggested that culture does not matter, because immigrant women simply 
replicate their parents’ behavior, as Furtado et al. (2013) explain. Unfortunately, we 
cannot extend our work to the study of the vertical transmission of culture because we do 
not have information on the parents; however, we can examine whether the immigrant 
women’s sensitivities to their home-country mean number of children differs depending 
on whether they live in predominantly same-ethnicity communities, as Furtado et al. 
(2013) suggest. This analysis is based on the idea that parents’ behavior regarding fertility 
is the same, regardless of where they live. Under that assumption, we may interpret a 
stronger relationship between the cultural proxy and the own number of children born into 
                                                            
16 Because of convergence problems in the estimations of the double hurdle models presented in columns 3 
to 6, we could not include fixed effects. In any case, the Tobit model has been estimated incorporating fixed 
effects and our findings do not vary. 
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predominantly same-ethnic communities, as empirical evidence that culture is horizontally 
transmitted.  
The possibility that the culture can be transmitted horizontally is also mentioned in 
Fernández and Fogli (2009). They explain that local communities can maintain culture 
either by providing role models for acceptable family behavior, or by punishing deviance 
from the social norm. To identify that horizontal transmission of culture, we consider an 
empirical strategy similar to that followed by Bertrand et al. (2000), also used in Furtado 
et al. (2013), for the analysis of network effects. Formally, we estimate the following 
equation: 
                                                         
where     is the proportion of immigrant women from the same country of origin j in each 
metropolitan area k,    represents the country of origin fixed effects, and      is the error 
term. The remaining variables have been defined above. The country of origin fixed 
effects capture any unobservable determinant of fertility that varies by home country.  
We are interested in the interaction between the proportion of immigrant women of 
the same country of origin and the home-country mean number of children. If culture is 
transmitted horizontally, we would expect that an increase in the concentration of same-
ethnicity immigrants will increase the number of children more for immigrant women 
originating from countries with high mean numbers of children than for those from 
countries with low numbers of children born. Then,    should be positive. 
Table 8 reports the regression estimates. In the first column, we observe that the 
ethnic concentration has a negative and statistically significant effect, suggesting that the 
greater the concentration of individuals of the same ethnicity, the lower the number of 
children born. The same is observed in column 2, after including the home-country mean 
number of children born. The coefficient that captures the impact of the fertility culture 
has a positive sign, and its magnitude almost coincides with that obtained in column 5 of 
Table 3. To explore whether the negative effect of the proportion of individuals of the 
same ethnicity is maintained, regardless of the home-country mean number of children, we 
analyze the interaction between those two variables. By including the interaction in 
column 3, as expected, the coefficient picking up its effect is positive and statistically 
significant, so the negative relationship is not maintained for all countries. We can easily 
examine the results of the last column, where we exclude the home-country mean number 
of children born and we include the country of origin fixed effects, which allows us to 
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identify the role of culture variations in the interaction between ethnic concentration and 
home-country mean number of children, as Furtado et al. (2013) explain. As can be 
observed in column 4 of Table 8, our coefficient of interest increases from 0.17 to 0.23 
and remains highly significant. Focusing on a comparison across countries, for example, 
an increase of 10 percentage points in the concentration of German women leads to a 
decrease of 0.03 in the number of children that each German immigrant woman has (the 
mean number of children in Germany is 2.18). However, the same increase in the 
concentration of Mexican and Moroccan women results in an increase of 0.02 children per 
Mexican immigrant woman (the home-country mean number of children born in Mexico 
is 4.40) and an increase of 0.03 children per woman in the case of Moroccan immigrant 
women (the home-country mean number of children born in Morocco is 4.84). Thus, an 
increase in the concentration of women of the same ethnic community, results in a 
decrease in the number of children for women coming from countries where their 
counterparts have a low number of children, while an increase in the number of children of 
immigrant women is observed for those coming from countries of origin with high mean 
numbers of children. The increase is greater, the higher the home-country cultural proxy.  
The magnitude of the effect of the horizontal transmission of culture is small, 
which may indicate that vertical transmission is more important in the transmission of 
culture. Of course, we recognize that this is not a full-proof method of identifying the 
transmission of culture, but it is comforting that our results suggest that immigrants are 
sensitive to their ethnic communities, which gives us additional empirical evidence that 
not only do laws and institutions affect women's decisions about how many children they 
have, but also that social norms may play an important role. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In recent decades, there has been a considerable decline in the fertility rates of many 
countries, with those rates reaching levels below the replacement rate in many developed 
countries (set at 2.1 children per woman), whereas in other countries, mainly developing 
countries, the fertility rate has remained quite high. This leads us to wonder whether 
economic conditions, laws, and institutions are the only factors affecting fertility behavior, 
or whether the fertility culture (social norms) may also be important. A cross-country 
analysis to explore this issue is not useful because of the interrelations between all these 
variables. Thus, in order to examine whether culture plays a role in fertility decisions, we 
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have followed the epidemiological approach, using data on immigrant women arriving in 
the US when very young. All of these women grew up under the same US laws and 
institutions, so that the positive estimated relationship between the home-country mean 
number of children born and the number of children born to our sample may be interpreted 
as evidence that fertility culture plays a role in the fertility decisions of women.  
In contrast to prior works analyzing the effect of culture on fertility (Fernández and 
Fogli 2006; 2009), our initial results suggest that the cultural effect can only explain a 
small part of the cross-country variations in the number of children born. This can be due 
to the fact that our sample of countries of origin has been considerably extended, including 
both developed and developing countries. If the epidemiological approach is appropriate 
to examine the cultural effect, this should not be an important issue since our sample of 
women grew up under similar macroeconomic conditions in the US. In addition, other 
characteristics of the countries of origin (GDP per capita, FLFP, and unemployment rate) 
which may vary between developed and developing countries do not appear to be driving 
our estimates. It could also be explained by the differences in the sample used since prior 
works focus on second-generation immigrants whereas we use information from young 
arrival first-generation immigrants. However, the cultural impact decreases as generations 
pass, Marcén (2014), so by using a sample of first-generation immigrants, the cultural 
effect should be greater than that observed for second-generation immigrants. In any case, 
our sample of first-generation immigrants can be considered quite similar to a sample of 
second-generation immigrants, as Furtado et al. (2013) explain. A similar effect is 
detected when the cultural proxy is measured in different years, so this does not appear to 
be a factor in our estimated small cultural effect. In our work, we show that the cause of 
the small cultural effect appears to be the way in which the cultural proxy is measured. 
One measure of culture for each country of origin appears not to be sufficient to measure 
fertility culture. The impact of culture considerably increases when the cultural proxy is 
more precisely measured within each country of origin, calculating the cultural proxy by 
age, education level, and employment status. This suggests that, depending on the 
women’s characteristics, it is more socially acceptable to have more, or fewer children, 
and that this may vary across countries. 
We also view our findings as evidence that cultural differences constitute a 
potential barrier to cross-country convergence in fertility rates. On the one hand, we find 
that fertility culture not only affects the number of children born, but also the decision to 
have children, or not. Our results show that the higher the home-country mean number of 
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children born, the higher the number of women originating from those countries that will 
decide to have children, and among those who do decide to have children, the higher the 
home-country mean, the higher the number of children that women will have, whence it 
may be inferred that the fertility gap across countries may be maintained or even increase 
because of cultural differences. On the other hand, an examination of the horizontal 
transmission of culture appears to reveal that women living in the same ethnic 
communities, whose counterparts in their countries of origin have many children, tend to 
have more children in their host country, but this is not observed in the case of those 
immigrant women whose counterparts have few children. Thus, since women appear to be 
sensitive to the behavior of the communities in which they live, those living in countries 
where women have many children would be more likely to have many children and those 
living in countries with low fertility rates would be more likely to have few children, 
which may maintain the fertility gap across countries. 
 How can the fertility culture be changed? This is a tricky question. The special 
treatment (primarily economic) that families with 3 or more children enjoy, does not 
appear to encourage couples to have more children in developed countries. The 
ineffectiveness of those policies has also been observed in the application of other policies 
whose objective was also to reverse the negative trend of fertility rates, such as that 
enacted in Spain in 2007 (Law 35/2007), known as ‘the baby check’, but that was only 
applied in a short period, from 2007 to 2010. In order to reduce population growth, 
policies of birth control were in effect in China between 1979 and 2015. Today, this policy 
has been partly removed because China has a huge need for workers. Nonetheless, the 
response of Chinese women to the change in the legislation does not appear to be what the 
Chinese government expects, indeed the current fertility rates have not changed. After so 
many years of birth control, it could be expected that the social norms on fertility would 
have changed. Other measures have had unexpected impacts on the fertility decisions of 
women. Under the slogan "Do it for Mom!", a Danish travel agency encourages parents 
who want to be grandparents to pay for a vacation period for their children and their 
partners. Surprisingly, nine months later, there has been a considerable increase in the 
number of births in Denmark. It is unlikely that this will be maintained in the long run if 
the social norms in Denmark do not also change. Therefore, since culture appears to play a 
role in the fertility behavior of women, policy-makers should consider carefully which 
measures have the potential to change social norms, and should remember that culture 
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changes slowly, so policies should be applied for long periods of time in order to have the 
desired effect.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of the total fertility rate from 1980 to 2014
 
Notes: Data come from the World Bank Data. The mean TFR represented in this figure has been 
calculated using information on all countries with available data for the period considered. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between the TFR in 1980 and the TFR in 2014, by country
 
Notes: Data come from the World Bank Data. 
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Figure 3: The number of children that immigrant women have in the US and the 
mean number of children born in their respective countries of origin 
 
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born, calculated using data from the 
International IPUMS, is plotted on the x-axis, while the mean number of children per immigrant 
woman of those countries of origin, calculated using data from the 5% IPUMS of the 1990 US 
census, is plotted on the y-axis. Note that we include here only those countries of origin whose 
immigrant women living in the US have less than two children per woman, on average.  
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Figure 4: The number of children that immigrant women have in the US and the 
mean number of children born in their respective countries of origin: Women aged 
20 to 29 
 
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born, calculated using data from the 
International IPUMS, is plotted on the x-axis, while the mean number of children per immigrant 
woman of those countries of origin, calculated using data from the 5% IPUMS of the 1990 US 
census, is plotted on the y-axis. In both cases, women aged 20 to 29 are considered. 
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Figure 5: The number of children that immigrant women have in the US and the 
mean number of children born in their respective countries of origin: Women aged 
30 to 39 
 
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born, calculated using data from the 
International IPUMS, is plotted on the x-axis, while the mean number of children per immigrant 
woman of those countries of origin, calculated using data from the 5% IPUMS of the 1990 US 
census, is plotted on the y-axis. In both cases, women aged 30 to 39 are considered. 
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Figure 6: The number of children that immigrant women have in the US and the 
mean number of children born in their respective countries of origin: Women aged 
40-46 
   
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born, calculated using data from the 
International IPUMS, is plotted on the x-axis, while the mean number of children per immigrant 
woman of those countries of origin, calculated using data from the 5% IPUMS of the 1990 US 
census, is plotted on the y-axis. In both cases, women aged 40 to 46 are considered. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics by country of origin 
Country of origin 
Home-country 
mean number of 
children born 
Immigrant 
women Children 
born 
Age High School Some college More college Observations 
Hungary 2.14 2.28 35.52 0.31 0.28 0.31 29 
Germany 2.18 2.01 31.82 0.35 0.38 0.18 1,799 
Austria 2.28 2.07 38.19 0.24 0.35 0.37 68 
Greece 2.42 1.75 32.66 0.32 0.33 0.29 73 
Spain 2.62 1.78 27.69 0.42 0.30 0.19 108 
Canada 2.66 2.11 33.62 0.28 0.42 0.25 710 
China 2.91 2.57 35.73 0.14 0.29 0.39 51 
Argentina 2.98 1.76 29.88 0.34 0.28 0.36 50 
Chile 3.23 1.47 28.27 0.27 0.27 0.33 15 
Thailand 3.23 1.44 22.39 0.28 0.39 0.00 18 
Vietnam 3.28 1.71 26.83 0.29 0.42 0.08 24 
Jamaica 3.44 1.89 29.51 0.31 0.47 0.13 45 
Philippines 3.66 1.84 28.89 0.32 0.43 0.17 259 
Colombia 3.76 1.87 28.06 0.29 0.51 0.14 86 
Iran 3.89 1.81 34.06 0.13 0.31 0.50 16 
Brazil 3.90 1.88 32.58 0.32 0.20 0.44 50 
Venezuela 3.92 1.77 33.06 0.13 0.32 0.48 31 
Panama 3.95 1.76 33.54 0.31 0.36 0.30 118 
Turkey 4.00 1.65 27.35 0.32 0.29 0.26 34 
El Salvador 4.11 1.79 25.83 0.28 0.28 0.07 29 
Haiti 4.18 1.86 26.29 0.19 0.52 0.19 21 
Peru 4.24 1.97 31.00 0.24 0.55 0.16 38 
Ecuador 4.35 1.89 27.71 0.40 0.31 0.20 35 
Mexico 4.40 2.12 27.92 0.36 0.23 0.04 1,949 
Nicaragua 4.63 2.17 29.38 0.24 0.38 0.14 29 
Morocco 4.84 1.98 32.20 0.29 0.46 0.22 41 
Mean 3.28 2.03 30.40 0.33 0.33 0.16 
 Std.dev 0.98 1.12 7.16 0.47 0.47 0.36 
 Note: Countries of origin have been ordered from lowest to highest mean number of children born by country of origin, using data from the International 
IPUMS. The other descriptive statistics were constructed utilizing data from the 5% microdata sample of the 1990 US Census, IPUMS USA. The sample 
contains 5,726 observations of immigrant women, aged 16 to 46, originating from 26 different countries. 
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Table 2: The effect of culture on the number of children born 
Dependent Variable: Children born (1) (2) (3) 
Home-country mean number of children born 0.078** 0.067* 0.068* 
 
(0.029) (0.034) (0.036) 
Age 0.185*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
Age2/100 -0.195*** -0.199*** -0.197*** 
 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.033) 
High School Graduate -0.386*** -0.375*** -0.361*** 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) 
Some college -0.651*** -0.647*** -0.637*** 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
More college -0.965*** -0.949*** -0.947*** 
 
(0.096) (0.090) (0.083) 
State fixed effects No Yes No 
MSA fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 5,726 5,726 5,726 
R2 0.151 0.160 0.189 
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born is calculated using information on 
women having at least one child, from the International IPUMS. The sample, obtained from the 
5% microdata sample of the 1990 US Census, consists of immigrant women aged 16 to 46 who 
arrived in the US at or below the age of 5, who report a country of origin, and who have at least 
one child. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 
10% level. 
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Table 3: The effect of culture on fertility by age 
Dependent Variable: Children born (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Home-country mean number  0.194** 0.126** 0.075** 0.101*** 0.135*** 
of children born (0.075) (0.050) (0.034) (0.032) (0.024) 
Age -4.422*** -4.617*** 0.199*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 
 
(1.004) (1.019) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) 
Age2/100 5.079*** 5.310*** -0.216*** -0.209*** -0.215*** 
 
(1.161) (1.179) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) 
High School Graduate -0.769*** -0.763*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.406*** 
 
(0.103) (0.105) (0.050) (0.052) (0.061) 
Some college -1.273*** -1.263*** -0.702*** -0.704*** -0.666*** 
 
(0.155) (0.157) (0.056) (0.061) (0.069) 
More college -1.403*** -1.397*** -1.008*** -1.007*** -0.952*** 
 
(0.101) (0.103) (0.079) (0.082) (0.084) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed effects No No No No Yes 
Observations 823 823 5,399 5,399 5,399 
R2 0.194 0.194 0.154 0.156 0.165 
Notes: In column 1, the cultural proxy is calculated as in Table 2, while in the second column, 
the home-country mean number of children born has been calculated for women aged 40 to 46 
having at least one child. The cultural proxy in column 3 coincides with that included in Table 
2. In columns 4 and 5, the home-country mean number of children born has been calculated by 
country of origin and age group (20-29, 30-39, 40-46). Columns 1 and 2 incorporate immigrant 
women aged 40 to 46. The sample consists of immigrant women aged 20 to 46 in columns 3 to 
5. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 
10% level. 
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Table 4: The impact of culture on fertility by age group, education level, and employment status 
Dependent Variable: Children born (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Home-country mean number of  0.186*** 0.206*** 0.082** 0.211*** 0.278*** 0.112** 0.200*** 0.362*** 
children born (0.065) (0.035) (0.039) (0.049) (0.030) (0.046) (0.066) (0.061) 
Age 0.173*** 0.177*** 0.195*** 0.199*** 0.195*** 0.223*** -5.264*** -5.528*** 
 
(0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.018) (0.027) (0.016) (1.395) (1.548) 
Age2/100 -0.192*** -0.200*** -0.206*** -0.237*** -0.242*** -0.245*** 6.071*** 6.368*** 
 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.027) (0.036) (0.019) (1.609) (1.788) 
High School Graduate -0.266*** -0.209*** -0.434*** -0.428*** -0.394*** -0.447*** -0.703*** -0.630*** 
 
(0.073) (0.035) (0.050) (0.050) (0.064) (0.053) (0.139) (0.175) 
Some college -0.520*** -0.436*** -0.711*** -0.694*** -0.644*** -0.721*** -1.066*** -0.917*** 
 
(0.076) (0.048) (0.064) (0.057) (0.070) (0.056) (0.201) (0.280) 
More college -0.814*** -0.720*** -1.011*** -1.041*** -0.975*** -1.060*** -1.306*** -1.068*** 
 
(0.068) (0.031) (0.073) (0.063) (0.077) (0.065) (0.148) (0.227) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 4,635 4,635 4,635 3,634 3,634 3,634 540 540 
R2 0.164 0.174 0.162 0.191 0.203 0.179 0.230 0.266 
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born is defined by age, education level, and country of origin in columns 1 and 
2. Columns 3 and 6 use the same cultural proxy as in Table 2 for the sample of women of columns 1 and 2 and for the sample of 
women of columns 4 and 5, respectively. In columns 4 and 5, the home-country mean number of children born is calculated by age 
group, employment status, and country of origin. Columns 7 and 8 incorporate immigrant women aged 40 to 46 and the cultural 
proxy is measured by age, employment status, and country of origin. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5: Simple robustness checks 
Dependent Variable: Children born (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Home-country mean number of children born 1970 0.050** 
     
 
 
(0.022) 
     
 Home-country mean number of children born 1990  0.066* 0.125*** 0.196*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.192*** 
 
 (0.036) (0.023) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029) (0.065) 
Age 0.192*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.177*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 0.156*** 
 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.026) (0.024) (0.042) 
Age2/100 -0.206*** -0.198*** -0.214*** -0.199*** -0.240*** -0.240*** -0.185*** 
 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.036) (0.042) (0.033) (0.031) (0.057) 
High School Graduate -0.372*** -0.387*** -0.422*** -0.236*** -0.418*** -0.416*** -0.249 
 
(0.049) (0.044) (0.054) (0.030) (0.050) (0.052) (0.159) 
Some college -0.659*** -0.648*** -0.670*** -0.447*** -0.652*** -0.647*** -0.452*** 
 
(0.057) (0.054) (0.065) (0.047) (0.064) (0.068) (0.121) 
More college -0.935*** -0.949*** -0.956*** -0.738*** -0.982*** -0.958*** -0.754*** 
 
(0.090) (0.086) (0.080) (0.027) (0.071) (0.071) (0.126) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,533 5,656 5,329 4,573 3,564 3,516 1,782 
R2 0.165 0.175 0.203 0.207 0.149 0.165 0.175 
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born is calculated for 22 censuses of 1970 (those containing information in the 1970s) in column 1. We 
have excluded those immigrant women originating from Hungary and Morocco in columns 2 to 5, in which the home-country mean number of children born is 
defined as in table 2, by age group, by age group and education level, and by age group and employment status, respectively. Column 6 excludes immigrant 
women from China, and column 7 excludes those from China, Mexico, and Germany. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of 
origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6: More robustness checks, adding home-country observable characteristics  
Dependent Variable: Children born (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Home-country mean number of children born 0.101*** 0.139*** 0.175*** 0.268*** 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.051) (0.030) 
Age 0.190*** 0.182*** 0.179*** 0.194*** 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) 
Age2/100 -0.204*** -0.210*** -0.200*** -0.240*** 
 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.042) (0.035) 
High School Graduate -0.359*** -0.421*** -0.257*** -0.409*** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.049) (0.055) 
Some college -0.627*** -0.686*** -0.485*** -0.665*** 
 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059) 
More college -0.922*** -0.981*** -0.793*** -1.014*** 
 
(0.094) (0.081) (0.055) (0.069) 
GDP pc 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.006 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Female labor force participation 0.234 1.672 -0.213 0.971 
 
(0.250) (2.861) (3.276) (3.277) 
Total fertility rate 0.033 0.026 0.017 -0.039 
 
(0.051) (0.055) (0.067) (0.065) 
Unemployment rate -0.014** -0.014* -0.018** -0.016** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,726 5,399 4,635 3,634 
R2 0.162 0.159 0.167 0.195 
Notes: In column 1, the home-country mean number of children born is calculated as in Table 2. In 
columns 2 to 4, that variable has been measured by age group, age group and education level, and age 
group and employment status, respectively. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * 
Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 7: The effect of culture on the decision to have children, and if so, how many 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Tobit model Tobit model Cragg’s double hurdle model Hurdle Model 
   
First  Second First  Second 
   
Stage Stage Stage Stage 
Home-country mean number of children born 
born 
0.146*** 0.130*** 0.085** 0.121*** 0.129** 0.048*** 
 
(0.041) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.064) (0.012) 
Age 0.659*** 0.655*** 0.399*** 0.252*** 0.662*** 0.183*** 
 
(0.055) (0.053) (0.031) (0.043) (0.049) (0.019) 
Age2/100 -0.809*** -0.802*** -0.492*** -0.291*** -0.812*** -0.219*** 
 
(0.070) (0.071) (0.041) (0.058) (0.064) (0.027) 
High School Graduate -1.088*** -1.059*** -0.748*** -0.541*** -1.325*** -0.303*** 
 
(0.072) (0.062) (0.053) (0.069) (0.080) (0.026) 
Some college -1.850*** -1.823*** -1.231*** -0.871*** -2.134*** -0.508*** 
 
(0.130) (0.111) (0.105) (0.091) (0.144) (0.033) 
More college -2.797*** -2.731*** -1.804*** -1.273*** -3.093*** -0.764*** 
 
(0.168) (0.138) (0.113) (0.137) (0.157) (0.052) 
State fixed effects No Yes No No No No 
Observations 9,817 9,817 9,817 9,817 9,817 5,399 
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born has been defined by age group as in Table 3. In contrast to previous estimates, the sample selection 
includes immigrant women having no children. Columns (1) and (2) show the results of the estimation of a Tobit model, with and without fixed effects, 
respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates of a Cragg’s double hurdle model. Columns 5 and 6 correspond to the estimated coefficients of a hurdle 
model. In the first stage, a Logit model is estimated while, in the second stage, a truncated at zero negative binomial is estimated. Estimates are weighted. 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 
10% level.  
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Table 8: Horizontal transmission of culture and the number of children born  
Dependent Variable: Children born (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proportion of women of the same origin by MSA -0.132*** -0.138*** -0.654*** -0.856*** 
 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.207) (0.152) 
Home-country mean number of children born 
 
0.136*** 0.065 
 
  
(0.024) (0.041) 
 Proportion of women of the same origin by MSA x  
  
0.167** 0.233*** 
Home-country mean number of children born 
  
(0.070) (0.058) 
Age 0.204*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.190*** 
 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
Age2/100 -0.225*** -0.215*** -0.212*** -0.214*** 
 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) 
High School Graduate -0.408*** -0.407*** -0.409*** -0.409*** 
 
(0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Some college -0.665*** -0.667*** -0.668*** -0.668*** 
 
(0.066) (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) 
More college -0.955*** -0.955*** -0.950*** -0.948*** 
 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.082) (0.081) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,399 5,399 5,399 5,399 
R2 0.162 0.165 0.166 0.165 
Notes: The home-country mean number of children born has been calculated by country of origin and age group. 
Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at 
the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Census 
 
Country 
 
Census Year 
(IPUMS 
International) 
Argentina 1991 
Austria 1991 
Brazil 1991 
Canada 1991 
Chile 1992 
China 1990 
Colombia 1993 
Ecuador 1990 
El Salvador 1992 
Germany 1981 
Greece 1991 
Haiti 1982 
Hungary 1990 
Iran 2006 
Jamaica 1991 
Mexico 1990 
Morocco 1994 
Nicaragua 1995 
Panama 1990 
Peru 1993 
Philippines 1990 
Spain 1991 
Thailand 1990 
Turkey 1990 
Venezuela 1990 
Vietnam 1989 
Notes: This table shows the sample of countries of origin utilized to build 
the cultural proxy of our main analysis, that is, the 1990 home-country 
mean number of children born. 
